Authentication: A process used
to verify identity.
Bilateral Trust: The fact that
most business arrangements are based on formal and informal agreements
that involve only two companies and that trust is limited to those
companies or a subset of their employees.
Certificate: An electronic identifier
from a certificate authority that includes a signature made by a
CA with its private key. The authenticity of the signature is validated
by other users who trust the CA's public key. Certificates also
include the user's public key--relied on for data encryption or
verifying the user's own signature.
Public CA (Certificate Authority):
An entity that provides a way for two or more businesses to establish
trust by virtue of the fact t hat they each trust a third party.
That third party issues certificates to the businesses containing
public keys. VeriSign is the best known U.S. example of a public
CA.
CAPI (Crypto API): The industry's first
major security API framework. Developers are already writing to
CAPI to security-enable applications that will run on Microsoft
platforms.
CDSA (Common Data Security Architecture):
Intel's multi-API security framework for encryption and authentication.
CDSA has also been accepted by a working group of The Open Group,
and IBM, Intel and Netscape are working to refine it.
XUDA (Xcert Universal Database API):
A securit y API set from Xcert that lets application developers
tap both PKIX and SPKI/SDSI infrastructures.
SPKI/SDSI (Simple Public Key Infrastructure/Simple
Distributed Security Infrastructure): The SPKI efforts of the
IETF have been combined with SDSI, an approach outlined by MIT's
Ron Rivest and Microsoft's Butler Lampson. The IETF draft creates
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), emphasizing authorizations rather
than identities. It lets certificates be created that do not identify
a person, but that indicate what that person is authorized to do
on a network. SDSI/SPKI differs from the more developed and accepted
PKIX (Public Key Infrastructure X.509) in specifying a highly distributed,
client-focused trust model relying on delegated human-readable certificates.
For example, a business might issue "salesperson" certificates
to employees and those employees might issue "salesperson-customer"
certificates to customers, and only those customers identified as
customers associated with a salesperson will gai n entry. SDSI/SPKI
also is more flexible than PKIX in letting end users define rules
for processing certificates. It also rejects the complex ASN.1 syntax
of X.509. Considerable control is put in the hands of end users,
rather than relying on a centralized infrastructure for establishing
identities. The infrastructure also puts an emphasis on short-lived,
ephemeral certificates, reissued daily, for example, in lieu of
extensive reliance on CRLs.
Distinguished Names: The
idea within X.509 that a unique user name is married to each certificate,
even though users may have multiple names on a network.
Key: The formula used by an encryption
algorithm to change data to be unrecognizable.
Attribute: an extension of identification
concepts that describes user permissions to engage in specific activities
or to access network resources, i.e. to spend up to $500 or to access
part of a database. In certain contexts a unique name identifier
can also be used as an attribute.
Privilege-Based Attribute:
A term used in this article to lump those certificate or database
attributes otherwise known as capability, authority, policy, roles-based
or access attributes. Privilege attributes go beyond identifying
a person to describe specific rights they may exercise on or off
the network--for example, a privilege attribute may limit a person's
spending authority with a business partner, spell out read/write
access to a database, or indicate which network resources may be
accessed; it may also indicate rules or policies, such as time of
day in which resources are accessible.
SESAME (Secure European System for Applications
in a Distributed Multivendor Environment): A standard for certificate
authorities that is supported by some of Europe's largest providers.
SESAME supports privilege-based attributes.
Private-Key Encryption (symmetric):
A method of encryption in which the same key is used to encrypt
and decrypt. The process for delivering and updating these keys
can become cumbersome with large networks. Kerberos is a popular
private-key authentication approach used today with the Distributed
Computing Environment (DCE).
Public-Key Encryption (asymmetric):
A method of encryption that relies on the speed of symmetric private-key
encryption to perform a special-purpose encryption of data. This
data is then encrypted once again u sing the slower-speed symmetric
public key of the user for whom it is destined. Authentication occurs
when the recipient of data is able to decrypt that data using the
sender's public key.
CRL (Certificate Revocation List): A listing
of nonvalid user certificates that must be checked as part of every
authentication or encryption process.
Cross-Certification: The
process by which two CAs establish a trust relationship and issue
certificates to one another.
Policy: The mapping of user credentials
with the authority to act.
Digital Signature: The use
of public-key cryptography to assure identity tied to data sent
over a network. Digital signatures are created using a mathematical
summary of the data to be sent (a hash), which is encrypted with
the sender's private key and read by the recipient using the sender's
public key. Digital signatures assure the integrity of the data
and provide some support for nonrepudiation.
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy): PGP is an identity
trust model that has been implemented (and is marketed by a company
of the same name) in both a distributed and hierarchical fashion.
It typically is distinguished from PKIX or SDSI/SPKI by the fact
that it determines whether a certificate is valid (and not generated
by an impostor) through a web of trust. Multiple parallel paths
are examined and weighted to determine validity.
Application
and Transport Layer Security: Application-layer security tends
to be secure at all points in a network but either requires application
security embedding or reliance on still-emerging APIs; network-layer
securi ty encrypts node to node, but it can leave data in the clear
while residing on a specific network node. End-to-end security is
pro-vided through application-layer security, while transport-layer
security is typi-cally point-to-point. IPsec and Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) are two important network transport-layer security standards.
IPsec (IP Security): An IETF encryption/connection
authentication interoperability standard that supports both Internet
Security Association and Key Management Protocol/Oakley (ISAKMP/Oakley)
and Sun's Simple Key Management for IP (SKIP) key management schemes
in IPv4; ISAKMP-Oakley is speci-fied for IPv6. Because IPsec is
at the IP layer, it works with any TCP, UDP or Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) application without requiring an explicit
interface as does SSL. SKIP is promoted for its multicast support.
Key Management: The process
used to establish keys, encryption and authentication algorithms
in preparation for communication. ISAKMP/Oakley a nd SKIP can be
used for key management.
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